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“Test the West”:1 Reimagining Sovereignties 
in the Post-Soviet Space 
Cindy Wittke2 




With the incorporation of the Crimean Peninsula into Russian territory, the armed 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the temporary formation of the confederation of 
Novorossiia (New Russia), the international community of states has been witness to 
complex processes of reimagining territories, boundaries, citizenship, and fragmented 
sovereignties in the post-Soviet space. In its foreign policy agenda, Russia conceptual- 
izes all former Soviet republics as the ‘Near Abroad’, a special sphere of its interests 
and influence. This paper explores Russia’s use of the vocabulary of international law 
to legitimize its interventions in the Near Abroad, which is connected to the ‘Russkii 
1 “Test the West” was part of a headline addressing the so-called Ukraine Crisis in the 6 March 
2014 issue of the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit. The article focused on the short- and 
long-term implications of Russia’s role regarding Crimea for relations between Russia and 
the West; see Tina Hildebrand, Michael Thumann, and Bernd Ulrich, “Die Krimkrise: Wie 
weit geht Russland? Test the West”, Die Zeit (6 March 2014). 
2 Cindy Wittke is leader of the Frozen and Unfrozen Conflicts research group at the Leibniz- 
Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS) in Regensburg. This article 
outlines conceptual thoughts for the author’s  research project “‘Test  the West’: 
(Frozen) Conflicts and Contested Sovereignties in the Post-Soviet Space”. It results 
from the author’s contribution to an international conference on “East European 
Cataclysms and the Making of Modern International Law” and the preparation of a 
special issue on “International Law and Legal Education in Ukraine”, co-edited by 
Oksana Holovko-Havrysheva of  Ivan Franko National University of  Lviv  and  
Dietmar Müller  and  Stefan Troebst  of the Leibniz-Institute for the History and 
Culture of Eastern Europe (GWZO) in  Leipzig. An earlier draft of the article was also 
presented and discussed at the “Transnational Sovereignties: Constellations, Processes, 
Contestations” conference, convened by Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law Institute, 
Dickson Poon  School  of  Law,  King’s  College  London. 
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Mir’ (Russian World), another foreign policy concept that resonates with ideas of Neo- 
Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory and with the creation of a Eurasian space 
as a counter-concept to the West. Russia and its conceptualized antagonist, the West, 
take positions on public international (legal) front lines, evoking counter-narratives 
concerning their understandings of the meaning of the vocabulary of international 
law and politics, the regulation of international relations, and the foundations of 
world order. These clashes leave observers wondering: Russia may instrumentalize 
and manipulate the vocabulary of geopolitics, international law, and politics, but what 
if these clashes are also rooted in different imaginaries of international law and poli- 
tics? Against this background, this article aims to develop conceptual approaches to 
further investigate and gain a better understanding of the complex dimensions of the 
clashes between Russian and Western counter-narratives and discourses concerning 
the meanings and functions of basic principles of international law and politics as 
powerful societal regulative imaginaries. 
Keywords 
Russia – Near Abroad – post-Soviet space – Sovereignty – international law – foreign 
policy – Neo-Eurasianism 
1 Introduction 
The five-day Russo-Georgian War of August 2008, the incorporation of the 
Crimean Peninsula into Russian territory after a contested referendum and 
declaration of independence in March 2014, and the ongoing unresolved con- 
flict in Eastern Ukraine—particularly the temporary formation of a union 
or confederation between the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic 
and Donetsk People’s Republic, and their reference to the historicized idea 
of Novorossiia3—have made the international community of states witness 
3 The term Novorossiia (New Russia) originated in the eighteenth century and was histori- 
cally used in tsarist Russia to denote southern and eastern Ukraine. It was taken up, inter 
alia, by Putin and actors in the conflicted territories of the separatist republics of Luhansk 
and Donetsk to embed their separatist ambitions in a historicized territorial context (and 
claims). 
Available official Russian documents are referred to in English for better access to refer- 
ences (official translation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation or the 
presidential  administration). 
3 
to complex processes of contesting and reimagining territories, boundaries, 
citizenship, and sovereignties in the post-Soviet space under the aegis of the 
Russian Federation.4 Russia’s foreign policy agendas conceptualize all other 
fourteen newly independent states—with some variation when it comes to the 
Baltic states—that formerly belonged to the Soviet Union as its Near Abroad 
(blizhnee zarubezh’e), a politicized geographic space where Russia has special 
interests and influence and that appears, in effect, to be a space of particular 
contested, conditional, and hierarchal sovereignties. How does the Western 
literature address especially the challenges presented to boundaries, territo- 
ries, citizenship, and sovereignty in the course of the so-called Ukraine Crisis? 
Current debates in mainstream doctrinal international legal scholarship, with 
some exceptions,5 focus on Russia’s violations of international law and prin- 
ciples. Furthermore, analyses of Russian foreign policy have ranged from con- 
structivist approaches focused on identity formation and Western orientation 
in the 1990s and early 2000s to neo-realist analysis of Russia’s foreign policy 
since 2007–2008. Positivist international relations analysis, for instance, refers 
to neo-realism and geopolitics to explain Russia’s conduct in its Near Abroad 
since the Russo-Georgian War in 2008.6 Comparative political scientists are 
4 The terms post-Soviet space and post-Soviet area are debated but used in a descriptive way 
across disciplines to refer to the 15 newly independent states that formerly belonged to the 
Soviet Union (with some differentiation, e.g., between the four Baltic states and the eleven 
other states). See also, e.g., Alexander Salenko, “Legal Aspects of the Dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 and its Implications for the Reunification of Crimea with Russia in 2014”, 75(1)  
ZaöRV (2015), 141–166; Angelika Nußberger, “Russia”, mpepil, online edition (2009), 105–108. 
5 E.g., Boris N. Mamlyuk, “The Ukraine Crisis, Cold War ii, and International Law”, 16(3) Ger- 
man Law Journal (2015), 479–522; Outi Korhonen, “Deconstructing the Conflict in Ukraine: 
The Relevance  of  International  Law  to  Hybrid  States  and Wars”, 16(3) German Law 
Journal (2015), 452–478; Zoran Oklopcic, “Introduction: The Crisis in Ukraine Between 
the Law, Power, and Principle”, 16(3) German Law Journal (2015), 350–364; Lauri Mälksoo, 
Russian Approaches to  International  Law  (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015). 
6 E.g., with variations: Jure Vidmar, “The Annexation of Crimea and the Boundaries of the Will 
of the People”, 16(3) German Law Journal (2015), 356–383; Brad R. Roth, “The Virtues of Bright 
Lines: Self-Determination. Secession, and External Intervention”, 16(3) German Law Journal 
(2015), 384–415; Amandine Catala, “Secession and Annexation: The Case of Crimea”, 16(3) 
German Law Journal (2015), 581–607; Christian Marxsen, Anne Peters, and Matthias Hartwig, 
Symposium “The Incorporation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in the Light of Inter- 
national Law”, 75(1) ZaöRV (2015), 3–5; Christian Marxsen, “Territorial Integrity in Interna- 
tional Law—Its Concept and Implications for Crimea”, 75(1) ZaöRV (2015), 7–26; Veronika 
Bílková, “The Use of Force by the Russian Federation in Crimea”, 75(1) ZaöRV (2015), 28–50; 
Stefan Oeter, “The Kosovo Case—An Unfortunate Precedent”, 75(1) ZaöRV (2015), 51–74; Anne 
Peters, “Das Völkerrecht der Gebietsreferenden. Das Beispiel der Ukraine 1991–2014”, 5–6 
4 
engaging in ongoing discussions about the explanatory power of transforma- 
tion theories, the Western modernization and democratization paradigm, and 
the observed stability of post-Soviet authoritarian regimes.7 One theme that 
is common to works from different fields is the role of (Russian) propaganda, 
lawfare, and what is increasingly referred to as ‘information wars’. Debates on 
these three topics, in particular referring to the complex conflict constellations 
in Ukraine, frequently arrive at conclusions concerning the delegitimization 
of factual and legal arguments raised by Russia, and the same holds true the 
other way around when it comes to Russian perspectives on what it considers 
Western propaganda.8 
Osteuropa (2014), 101–134; Otto Luchterhandt, “Die Krim-Krise von 2014. Staats- und völker- 
rechtliche Aspekte”, 5–6 Osteuropa (2014), 61–86; Hans-Joachim Heintze, “Völkerrecht und 
Sezession—Ist die Annexion der Krim eine zuverlässige Wiedergutmachung sowjetischen 
Unrechts?”, 27(3) Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (2014), 129–138; 
Roy Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2013); Roy Allison, “Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the 
rules”, 90(6) International Affairs (2014), 1255–1297; Ted Hopf, “Identity, legitimacy, and the 
use of military force: Russia’s Great Power identities and  military intervention in Abkhazia”, 
31 Review of International Studies (2005), 225–243; Natasha Kuhrt, “Russian foreign policy”, 
in Graeme Gill  and James Young (eds.), Routledge  Handbook  of  Russian  Politics  and 
Society (Routledge, New York, 2012), 421–431; Robert Donaldson, “Russia and the states of the 
former Soviet Union”, in  Graeme  Gill  and James Young (eds.), Routledge  Handbook  of  
Russian Politics and Society (Routledge, New York, 2012), 432–443. 
7 Hans Höhmann  and  Hans-Henning Schröder (eds.), Russland  unter  neuer Führung. Politik, 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft am Beginn des 21. Jahrhundert (Agenda Verlag, Münster, 2001); 
Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransformation: eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der 
Transformationsforschung (Leske + Budrich, Opladen, 1999); Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtrans- 
formation: eine Einführung in die Theorie  und Empirie der Transformationsforschung (Spring- 
er vs, Wiesbaden, 2010); Eberhard Sandschneider, Stabilität und Transformation politischer 
Systeme: Stand und Perspektiven  politikwissenschaftlicher Transformationsforschung (Spring- 
er vs, Opladen, 1995); Dieter Segert, Transformationen in Osteuropa im 20. Jahrhundert (UTB, 
Wien, 2013). 
8 Gabriele Krone-Schmalz, Russland verstehen. Der Kampf um die Ukraine und die Arroganz 
des Westens (C.H. Beck, Munich, 2015) (this journalistic perspective—besides making some 
interesting arguments about how Russia is presented in Western media to the public—takes 
an almost explicitly pro-Russian point of view). The  author follows Mamlyuk, who finds that 
“Positivist accounts fail to acknowledge the role of information warfare or propaganda in 
fracturing and reconstructing the international legal order and the way in which the infor- 
mation war has emerged as a new form of lawfare.” Mamlyuk, op.cit. note 5, 493; see also 
Timm Beichelt, “Legitimer Autoritarismus? Politische Stabilität im postsowjetischen Raum”, 
64(8) Osteuropa (2014), 49–61. 
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Against this complex background of conflict constellations, this article’s fo- 
cus turns in particular to Russia’s foreign policy and its usage of the vocabulary 
of international law to legitimize its engagement in the Near Abroad and its 
promotion of the concept of Russkii Mir, which is connected to Russia’s role 
as the geopolitical continuator of the Soviet Union. Conceptually, both Near 
Abroad and Russkii Mir seem to resonate with contemporary theoretical and 
ideological approaches like Neo-Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory, 
as well as with the idea of creating a Eurasian space through the formation of 
a Eurasian Union as an institutionalized counter-concept to Western alliances. 
Russia and its conceptualized antagonizing West take positions on public in- 
ternational (legal) front lines in both the media and in international organi- 
zations, eliciting counter-narratives concerning their understandings of the 
vocabulary of international law and politics, the regulation of international 
relations, and the foundations of the contemporary world order.9 It is impor- 
tant to emphasize that using the term ‘the West’ reflects Russia’s anti-Western 
imaginaries and discourse, especially the construction of anti-Westernism in 
Neo-Eurasianism, and does not imply that the author understands ‘the West’ 
as a uniform or monolithic bloc or entity. In sum, this article aims to develop 
a better understanding of what is at stake in, and what are the inner logics 
and functions of, the current discursive clashes between Russia and the West. 
Under the surface of conflict constellations in Ukraine, these clashes have led 
to the formation of a different understanding of the universal, regional, and 
transnational meanings of sovereignty, territorial integrity, civilization, space, 
and Russia’s exercise of political and executive authority and force beyond its 
territorial borders. 
In developing conceptual approaches to understanding current processes 
of contesting territories, boundaries, citizenship, and sovereignties in the post- 
Soviet space, this article will proceed as follows. The next section will address 
the role of the foreign policy concepts of the Near Abroad and the Russkii Mir 
in Russia’s discourses and its involvement in (frozen) conflict constellations 
in the post-Soviet space. The third section will identify links between these 
concepts and Russia’s fragile stability as a post-Soviet authoritarian regime. 
The article will then present Neo-Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory 
as resonating variations of radical theoretical and ideological foundations for 
political practices of contesting sovereignty in post-Soviet (conflict) settings 
and blurring the lines between the domestic and international sphere. After 
9 See, for instance, UN Security Council protocols: S/PV.7124, 1 March 2014; S/PV.7125, 3 March 
2014; S/PV.7134, 13 March 2014; S/PV.7138, 15 March 2014; S/PV. 7144, 19 March 2014; S/PV. 7154, 
13 April 2014; S/PV.7157, 16 April 2014; S/PV.7165, 29 April 2014; S/PV. 7167, 2 May 2014. 
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outlining the many international and domestic dimensions of contested sov- 
ereignties in the post-Soviet space, the discussion will turn to the usage and 
attached meanings of the vocabulary of international law and politics that 
have materialized in the current discursive struggles between Russia and the 
West. The final section will conclude with a summary and an outlook. In  sum, 
the goal of this article is not to argue in the framework of binary distinctions 
of right or wrong, legal or illegal, violation or justification, legitimate or ille- 
gitimate; rather, by taking the perspectives outlined above, it aims to develop 
conceptual approaches to further investigation and better understanding of 
the complex dimensions of the clashes between Russian and Western counter- 
narratives  and  discourses  about  the meanings and functions of basic 
principles of international law and politics as powerful  societal regulative 
imaginaries. 
2 The Near Abroad and the Russkii Mir: Russia’s Foreign Policy 
Agenda, (Frozen) Conflicts, and Contested Sovereignties in the 
Post-Soviet Space 
The collapse of the Soviet Union raised the question of how the post-Soviet 
geopolitical space would be reshaped and reinterpreted and who would do 
this.10 A core question was and continues to be: What are Russia’s present and 
future roles in these processes?11 Since the beginning of the 1990s, Russia has 
defined the independent post-Soviet states as its Near Abroad. The concept of 
the Near Abroad is related to the idea of a Russkii Mir.12 Together, the Russkii 
Mir and Near Abroad function as key concepts in Russia’s foreign policy that 
are closely connected to Russia’s contentious engagements in Georgia and 
Ukraine.13 Moreover, the foreign policy concepts of the Near Abroad and the 
Russkii Mir are thought to resonate with certain ideas of Neo-Eurasianism, a 
form of historicized, traditionalist, civilizational, theoretical, and ideological 
framework that brings anti-modernism and anti-Westernism together under its 
umbrella. This especially reflects a clear antagonism toward what is considered 
10 See also Vladimer Papava, “The Eurasianism of Russian Anti-Westernism and the Concept 
of ‘Central Caucaso-Asia’”, 51(6) Russian Politics and  Law (2013), 45–86, at 45. 
11 See  also ibid., 47. 
12 The term ‘mir’ means “community”, “world”, and “peace”. Despite its common translation 
as Russian World, the author will continue using the transliteration Russkii Mir through- 
out the article. 
13 Susanne Spahn, “Cleverer Schachzug. Völkerrecht Russland und das Prinzip der ‘Schutz- 
verantwortung’”, 33–34(65) Das Parlament (10 August 2015), at 6. 
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the unipolar, hegemonic position of the United States in international law and 
politics, alongside a partly positive image of Europe as part of Eurasia with 
Russia as the ‘Heartland’ of a Eurasian zone. In short, Neo-Eurasianism is revi- 
talizing historicized self-images of Russia and its enemies, while also conjuring 
up new enemies (see discussions below in Section 4).14 
The relevance of an analytical focus on the concepts of the Near Abroad 
and the Russkii Mir is evident in the examples of post-Soviet de facto regimes 
like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria  that have built up quasi-state in- 
stitutions based on quasi-constitutions. Internationalized negotiation mecha- 
nisms have been established to settle the disputed status of these territories. 
From an international perspective, all three (frozen) status conflicts are in le- 
gal and political limbo, yet their internal status seems increasingly legalized 
and stabilized. Russia plays a particular role in these and other post-Soviet 
(frozen) conflicts and de facto state entities. On the one hand, no solution of 
(frozen) status conflicts seems feasible without Russia’s involvement in the 
various multilateral negotiation and conflict settlement mechanisms. On the 
other hand, Russia often plays the role of a kin or parent state for the putative 
internal stabilization of the de facto state entities and the perpetuation of their 
external limbo.15 Moreover, after recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
independent states in 2008, Russia officially signed an association and inte- 
gration agreement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2015.16 Meanwhile, the 
current crisis in Ukraine has implicitly and explicitly put the complexities of 
post-Soviet (frozen) conflict constellations on the international agenda again. 
Taken together, the foregoing developments appear to be shaped by a spe- 




Dmitry Shlapentokh, “The Great Friendship: Geopolitical Fantasies About the Russia/ 
Europe Alliance in the Early Putin Era (2000–2008)—The Case of Alexander Dugin”, 22(1) 
Journal of Contemporary Central  and  Eastern  Europe (2014), 49–79, at 49; Ray Silvius, “The 
Russian State, Eurasianism, and Civilisations in the Contemporary Global  Political Econ- 
omy”, 2(1) Journal of Global Faultlines (2014), 44–69, at 48; Ashot Manutscharjan, “Der ge- 
pflegte Mythos”, 33–34(65) Das Parlament (10 August 2015), at 5. 
Cindy Daase, “Abchasien, Süd-Ossetien und Transnistrien—de facto-(Klein)-Staaten im 
postsowjetischen Raum”, in  Sebastian Wolf (ed.), State Size Matters, Politik und  Recht 
im Kontext von Kleinstaatlichkeit und Monarchie (Springer vs, Wiesbaden, 2016), 219–
249; For a comprehensive analysis of causes of internal wars in post-Soviet states, 
see, e.g., Christoph Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and 
Nationhood in the Caucasus (NYU Press, New York, 2007). 
Spahn, op.cit. note 13, 6; press statement following talks with President of South Osse- 
tia Leonid Tibilov (18 March 2015), available at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ 
transcripts/47876>. 
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international legal vocabulary to argue for its engagement and interventions in 
the post-Soviet space.17 The examples provided relate to two caesuras in Rus- 
sian foreign policy: the Russo-Georgian War of 2008,18 and then the so-called 
Euromaidan protests in 2013–2014, which in Ukraine is usually referred to as 
the Revolution of Dignity (Revoliutsiia hidnosti), the starting point of a process 
that led to protracted conflict constellations with Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
statehood at stake.19 In 2008, the so-called Medvedev Doctrines envisioned— 
seemingly in the geopolitical tradition—the possibility of using military force 
to protect ‘Russians abroad’ and defend the sovereignty of the Russian state 
against arbitrary involvement.20 Later that year, in August, Russia fought a war 
with Georgia, pointing to its responsibility to protect ‘Russians abroad’, among 
other things.21 In fact, due to what is commonly   referred to as ‘passportization’, 
numerous inhabitants of the de facto state entities of Abkhazia and South Os- 
setia have Russian citizenship. 
In the case of the Ukraine Crisis, the constellation is different. It resonates in 
particular with the foreign policy concept of the Russkii Mir. According to the 
civilizational concept of the Russkii Mir, Russia considers Russians abroad to 
include not only citizens of Russia living abroad but also ethnic Russians and 
what are called Russian-speaking people, all of whom belong to the Russkii Mir 
of which Russia is the responsible guardian and ‘Heartland’. Thus, the defini- 
tions of who is Russian and who is a Russian abroad go beyond modern forms 
17 Vladislav Tolstykh, “Three Ideas  of Self-Determination in International Law  and  the Re- 
unification of Crimea with Russia”, 75(1) ZaöRV (2015), 119–140. 
18 See Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on  the  Conflict in Georgia Reports, 
Vol. i–iii, availableat<https://web.archive.org/web/20091007030130/http://www.ceiig.ch/ 
pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf>,      <http://web.archive.org/web/20110706223037/http://www 
.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf>,    and    <http://web.archive.org/web/20110814045  
152/http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_III.pdf>. 
19 Mälksoo, op.cit. note 5, 180; Spahn, op.cit. note 13, 6; Silvius, op.cit. note 14, 46; for ap- 
proaches to, and debates about, Russian foreign policy in the 1990s and early 2000s, and 
especially during Putin’s first term as president, see, e.g., Allison, op.cit. note 6; Hopf, 
op.cit. note 6; Kuhrt, op.cit. note 6; Donaldson, op.cit. note 6; President of Russia, Speech 
and  the  Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy (10 February 
2007); President of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (12 
July 2008), available at <http://archive.mid.ru//bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdc 
c32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38!OpenDocument>; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Federation, Approved by President of the Russian Federation v. Putin (12 February 2013). 
20 President of Russia, Speech and the Following Discussion, ibid. 
21 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, op.cit., note 19; Silvius, op.cit. note 
14, 45; Spahn, op.cit. note 13, 6. 
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of citizenship to stress a traditionalist, cultural, civilizational concept of who 
is Russian and who belongs to the Russkii Mir, directly translatable as ‘Russian 
world’ or ‘Russian community’. Accordingly, the Russkii Mir stretches beyond 
states’ borders, contesting states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, to rede- 
fine citizenship in a folkish-traditional way, especially in the Near Abroad.22 
Finally, in annexing part of another state’s territory with the Crimean Penin- 
sula, Russia referred, inter alia, to its responsibility to protect Russians abroad 
and their belonging to the heartland of Russia. Since the summer of 2014, Rus- 
sia has furthermore exercised a much-discussed degree of political and mili- 
tary control over the separatist Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk 
People’s Republic. During the Ukraine Crisis, the concept of the Russkii Mir 
has resonated with the idea of an inherent civilizational connection between 
Russians and Ukrainians as one people, belonging to one historic space, that 
goes back to Kievan  Rus’. Consequently, Russia’s controversial role in what is 
now generally termed ‘hybrid warfare’ in Ukraine—that is, the use of irregu- 
lar forms of involvement, control, and force—amounts to a type of conduct 
that has changed the prevailing analysis of Russian foreign policy in the Near 
Abroad.23 However, it should also be emphasized that the turmoil in Ukraine 
is not just a two-sided interstate conflict between Russia and Ukraine. A mul- 
titude of actors driven by diverse interests have spawned these complex and 




Mälksoo, op.cit. note 5, 182; Papava, op.cit. note 10, 47–48. 
Nikoly Mitrokhin, “Infiltration, Instruktion, Invasion. Russlands Krieg in der Ukraine”, 
64(8) Osteuropa (2014), 3–16, at 3, 5; Korhonen, op.cit. note 5, 453; Elizabeth Dunn, Michael 
Bobick, “The Empire Strikes Back: War Without War and Occupation Without Occupation 
in the Russian Sphere of Influence”, 41(3) American Ethnologist (2014), 405–413. 
These complex constellations may be both the reason for, and the outcome of, the hy- 
brid war and ambiguous strategies that are currently keeping Eastern Ukraine in a fragile 
limbo of ‘not yet peace’ while the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine remain 
permanently challenged, Korhonen, op.cit. note 5, 464. A first set of open interviews with 
Ukrainian international lawyers, members of the Ukrainian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
and members of the Ukrainian parliament (Rada) show a common argument in Ukrai- 
nian international legal discourse with the following line of reasoning about the legal 
character of the hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine: the Ukraine Crisis is (1) an international 
conflict, and (2) all  interview partners  across  different  political camps  have uniformly 
refused to even consider direct talks with actors/leaders of separatists from Eastern 
Ukraine without a Russian  proxy; in effect, this would  mean (3)  recognizing a domestic 
dimension of the conflict and the relevance of  the separatist  claims. Interviews with the 
author; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “On Violations  of  Ukraine’s 
Law in  Force  and of Ukrainian-Russian Agreements by Military Units of the Black Sea 
Fleet of the Russian Federation in the Territory of Ukraine” (3 March 2014); Oleksandr 
Merezhko,   “Crimea’s  Annexation  by  Russia—Contradictions of the New  Russian
10 
The  complex  conceptual  challenges  outlined  above warrant the 
preliminary assumption that neither doctrinal international legal viewpoints 
nor purely neo-realist, geopolitical, or great-power international political 
perspectives on Russia’s conduct and rhetorical usage of international law 
will further the understanding of the meanings and functions of underlying 
concepts and dis- courses that challenge the Russian and the Western usages 
of the vocabulary of international law and politics in spheres of common and 
clashing interests in  the  post-Soviet space.25 
Before further exploring the contested sovereignties, borders, territories, 
and citizenship in the post-Soviet space from a discursive international law 
and politics perspective, the current domestic regime in Russia needs to be 
addressed. For the purpose of unpacking contested sovereignties in the post- 
Soviet area, such a discussion should focus on academic debates that find 
themselves challenged to explain the resilience of authoritarian regimes’ 
power and legitimacy and the interconnections between the international and 
domestic spheres.26 
3 Stability,  Legitimacy, and  Identity in  Post-Soviet 
Authoritarian Regimes 
Despite an initial period of optimism about democratic transformation in the 
newly independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union, authoritarian 
regimes have remained resistant in most parts of the post-Soviet space.27 Mod- 
ernization and democratization approaches have not managed to fully capture 
the complexities of transformation processes or, in particular, to explain the 
rise, stability, and relative legitimacy of post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. Con- 
sequently, current debates in the literature are increasingly seeking distance 
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and democratization as a yardstick by which to measure transformation pro- 
cesses (of post-Soviet states). The challenge is to search for new paradigms that 
explain hybrid and asymmetric power relations,28 and that help in approach- 
ing questions like what makes the Russian regime legitimate. 
Beichelt convincingly finds that: 
In the post-Soviet space, normative standards of the liberal democracy 
theory are annulled through authoritarian practices and anti-
emancipatory ideas without the majority of the populations being 
bothered by these developments. This does not imply, however, that 
observers, i.e. Western politicians, journalists, or scholars, have to give 
up their ideals of democracy. Yet, for understanding current 
developments in Eastern Europe, it seems essential to not a priori 
declare the empirical conditions and normative reasoning of recognition 
of rule and authority in the post-Soviet space as inappropriate.29 
The general assumption is that those in power will seek to secure some con- 
sent concerning the legitimacy of their power, at least from the most impor- 
tant actors and groups among their subordinates.30 Disciplines differ in their 
approaches to the question of what is legitimate power.31 Generally, however, 
legitimacy can be understood as a multidimensional concept that differen- 
tiates legal, normative, and empirical aspects of accepted and unaccepted 
exercises of power. Following Beetham, power can be considered legitimate 
insofar as (1) it is exercised in line with established rules, (2) these rules can be 
justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominants and subordinates, 
and (3) there is evidence of the subordinates’ consent to the particular power 
relationship. What counts as consent is a culturally specific matter determined 
by the conventions of a given society,32 with the caveat that no society can be 
said to have complete uniformity of beliefs.33 In the end, both legitimacy and/ 
28 Beichelt, op.cit. note 8, 60–61. 
29 Ibid., 61 (translation by the author, original quote in German). 
30 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Palgrave, London, 1991), 3. 
31 Ibid., 4 et seq. 
32 Legal validity is insufficient to secure legitimacy, since the rules by which power is ac- 
quired and exercised stand in need of justification (rightful source of authority). This is 
the second level of legitimacy: power is legitimate to the extent that the rules of power 
can be  justified  in  term  of  beliefs  shared by both dominant and subordinate. See  
Beetham,  op.cit. note 30, 16–17, 19. 
33 Beichelt, op.cit. note 8, 52; Beetham is critical when it comes to Weber’s definition of le- 
gitimacy as “belief in legitimacy” (Legitimitätsglauben). See Beetham, op.cit. note 30, 6 et 
seq., 17. 
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or illegitimacy can materialize in each of the three dimensions—that is, each 
can be realized to a different degree in a given context—without necessarily 
affecting the evaluation of legitimacy in the others. In the end, Beetham finds 
that “the social scientist, in concluding that a given power relationship is le- 
gitimate, is making a judgement, not delivering a report about people’s belief 
in legitimacy”.34 
Power, meanwhile, is created through social interaction, highlighting the 
relevance of social psychology, that is, social and psychological processes of 
self-categorization and collective identification.35 As a theoretical and ana- 
lytical framework, social psychology is gaining attention in authoritarianism 
research concerned with the relationship between identity and power.36 The 
formation of collective identity is not primarily rooted in the satisfaction of 
needs or interests, but in the responsive construction of meaning(s), namely 
the meaning of the self in the social context and the interaction between self- 
and collective identity.37 The question, then, is who responds to and who inter- 
prets collective identity. In the case of the Russian regime, the general Western 
opinion assumes that acceptance of, or indifference to, the regime and its ac- 
tions is strongly rooted in the mechanisms of state propaganda.38 In contrast, 
Boris Dubin, former  head of  the Department of  Socio-Political   Research  at  
the Levada  Center, argues  that  Russian  domestic and international politics 
could still be accepted in the absence of propaganda spread by state-
controlled media, as propaganda itself is not the sole source of collective 
identity and consciousness, but rather  an  instrument  to  nourish, enhance, 
and steer collective identity  and  consciousness.  Propaganda  does  this  
especially when it declares a permanent state of exception and emergency: 
political events are  defined as emergent and exceptional in order to influence 
collective  opinion by pointing to a common threat to the collective identity, 
as is currently done in Russia.39  This common  identity is supposed to break 
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individual by  stressing the importance of  the community and postulating and 
promoting differences between Russian and Western identities. 
The break with the West, conceptualized as an antagonist, is the key concept 
in the following section, which addresses how the foreign policy agenda and 
domestic functionality of post-authoritarian Russia, as  the continuator of the 
Soviet Union, might  compare with Neo-Eurasianism as a theoretical and ideo- 
logical concept that seems to  resonate with policy concepts that, like the Near 
Abroad and the Russkii Mir, shape domestic and international politics and the 
(transitional) contestation of sovereignty, territories, borders, and citizenship 
in the post-Soviet space. In this space, the inside and outside of domestic and 
international affairs have been left aside, and the view has shifted to what in 
effect are different conceptualizations of sovereignty: the strong sovereignty 
of the ‘Heartland’ versus the contested, conditional sovereignty of the Near 
Abroad.40 This aspect leads back to one of this article’s initial questions: Russia 
may well instrumentalize  and manipulate the vocabulary of geopolitics, inter- 
national law, and politics, but what if these clashes are also rooted in different 
imaginaries of international law and politics? The next section aims to unravel 
the origins of the cleavages between Russia and the West, which are packed 
in—yet  seem to go beyond—the language and instruments of geopolitics. 
4 Exploring Post-Soviet Ideologies: Neo-Eurasianism  and  the 
Fourth Political Theory 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the question of how to  reshape and re- 
interpret the imagination of a post-Soviet geopolitical space came to the fore- 
front.41 In this regard, Russia’s transformation since the 1990s has  been  shaped 
by a search for identity.42 During the Putin era, and indeed since the late 1990s, 
the Russian state has promoted common-sense thinking about global affairs 
by producing a relatively coherent set of concepts about the world order that 
were created to counter liberal internationalism.43 The core issue remains the 
nature of Russia’s reimagining of its role in the post-Soviet space and the effect 
this has on the imaginations of sovereignties in the post-Soviet space.44 As 
40 Matthew Schmidt, “Is Putin Pursuing the Policy of Eurasianism?”, 13(1) Demokratizatsiya 
(2005), 87–99, at 88. 
41 Papava, op.cit. note 10, 45. 
42 Silvius, op.cit. note 14, 44. 
43 Ibid., 47 et  seq. 
44 Papava, op.cit. note 10, 47. 
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indicated above, the concepts of the Near Abroad and the Russkii Mir seem to 
resonate with Neo-Eurasianism in that they frame foreign policy goals while 
also supporting forms of authoritarian domestic rule. Hence, this section will 
address in particular how the Neo-Eurasianist movement contributes to the 
re-imagination and contestation of sovereignties, territories, borders, and citi- 
zenship in  the  post-Soviet  space and Russia’s  role  in  it. 
At the core of this section is the Neo-Eurasianism of Alexander Dugin, for- 
mer professor of sociology at Moscow State University,45 who is said to have 
or have had the ear of high-ranking members of both the Duma and the presi- 
dential administration in the Kremlin.46 Neo-Eurasianism serves the purposes 
of critiquing perceived American hegemony, consolidating and defending Rus- 
sia’s political apparatus, and obtaining legitimacy for Russia’s state conduct 
at the domestic and international levels. According to Neo-Eurasianist ideas, 
legitimacy and identity are no longer based on a common project of modern- 
ization (as in the Soviet Union), but on a radical perception of civilizational 
differences and traditions.47 Responsiveness is generated through appeals to 
the longue  durée  of common traditionalist culture, civilizational ideas, and re- 
ligious beliefs.48 
So does Neo-Eurasianism amount to a theoretical and ideological justifi- 
cation of contemporary Russian anti-Westernism?49 Can Neo-Eurasianism 
be considered an expression of Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions?50 Neo- 
Eurasianism primarily reflects various post-Soviet attempts to elaborate 
Eurasianist ideas in a comprehensive philosophical or political doctrine.51 A 
brainchild of post-1917 revolutionary Russian émigrés, the original doctrine 
of Eurasianism differed from two other leading approaches to Russians’ view 
of Russia’s place in the world: Slavophilism and Westernism. Slavophiles be- 
lieved Russia was part of a pan-Slavic world, whereas Westernizers assumed 
that Russia was part of the West, considered in a very broad sense. Eurasian- 
ists, however, proclaimed that Russia was neither part of the pan-Slavic world 
(to which it nevertheless refers) nor part of the West. Instead, Eurasia would 
45 Dugin was dismissed from Moscow State University in summer 2014. 
46 Jean-Marie Chauvier, “Die Wiederentdeckung Eurasiens. Putin erhebt eine alte Idee zur 
geopolitischen Doktrin”, Le Monde Diplomatique (12 June 2014), available at <http://www 
.monde-diplomatique.de/pm/2014/06/13.mondeText1.artikel,a0051.idx>,    14. 
47 On ‘modernity’ and ‘mentality’, see Lambach and Göbel, op.cit. note 39, 85. 
48 Ibid., 91. 
49 Papava, op.cit. note 10, 45. 
50 Ibid., 49. 
51 Silvius, op.cit. note 14, 50. 
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constitute a unique civilizational entity of its own, peopled by a blend of Or- 
thodox Slavs and Muslims with Russia as its ‘Heartland’.52 
Dugin’s  view from  circa  2000  until  2008  was  that  Europe  and  Russia  were 
not antithetical to each other but were instead related. Both Europe and Russia, 
according to Dugin, could well develop according to the same principles. 
Dugin strongly supported the idea of pan-European unity, even referring to 
the from a Neo-Eurasianist’s perspective unpopular Gorbachev’s idea of a 
‘Common European Home’.53 Hence, debates over Neo-Eurasianism, 
civilizational differences, and geopolitical identity have proliferated since the 
1990s  and seem to have gained importance in contemporary Russia.54 Neo-
Eurasianist and broader civilizational concepts offer Russia an ideological 
framework for demonstrating that its foreign policy agenda and current 
conduct draw on a longue durée of “Russian tradition”, and that Russia’s 
“state-led Eurasian integration” initiatives rest upon a cultural legitimacy 
rooted in cultural and civilizational differences between Russia and the West, 
as well as in Russia’s special historical and cultural role in the Eurasian 
space.55 Neo-Eurasianism and Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory revived 
geopolitics as a phenotype of an ideological, cultural, and civilizational 
framework, leading to the redefinition of the area and geographies of the 
post-Soviet space while also actively furthering the delegitimization of an 
antagonistic West.56  Reference to common civilizational and cultural narratives 
enables the Russian state to challenge universalist (Western) approaches to 
state conduct and emphasize that liberal democracy constitutes a hegemonic 
geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural project emanating from the 
West   in  general and the United States in  particular.57 
52 For  Eurasianism’s  connections  and  distinctions  to Pan-Slavism , see Schmidt, op.cit. 
note 40, at 93 et seq.; Shlapentokh, op.cit. note 14, at 51; Alexander Dugin, Die Vierte 
Politische Theorie (Arktos Media, Budapest, 2013); Alexander Dugin, Last War of the 
World-Island: The Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia (Arktos Media, Budapest, 2015); 
Alexander Dugin,  Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism (Arktos Media, 
Budapest, 2014). 
53 Shlapentokh, ibid., at 58. 
54 Silvius, op.cit. note 14, 49. 
55 Papava, op.cit. note 10, 49. 
56 There are five categories or dimensions of Eurasianism in contemporary Russian geo- 
political thought: expansionism, civilizationism, stabilizationism, geoeconomism, and 
Westernism; Papava, op.cit. note 10, 62 et seq.; See also David Armitage, Foundations of 
Modern International Thought (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013), 32. 
57 In short, liberalism and democratization are regarded as adversarial/hostile hegemonic 
ideologies of the West, particularly the United States. See Silvius, op.cit. note 14, at 45; 
Manutscharjan, op.cit. note 14, 5. 
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The ultimate purpose of this line of argumentation was to demonstrate 
that the reconstitution of a state-sanctioned Russian geopolitical identity was 
not occurring in a historical or ideological vacuum. The Near Abroad and the 
Russkii Mir resonate with historicized imperial and geographical definitions 
aimed, for instance, at creating a Eurasian Union—a shared continent state 
with a common economy, transport corridors, and representative bodies.58 
The Russian case of Neo-Eurasianist thinking demonstrates the renewed po- 
liticization  and  significance of historical and traditional collective ima-
ginaries and subjectivities.59 
Furthermore, in his book The Fourth Political Theory, Dugin declares Fas- 
cism  and Communism failed and dead. He also announces the end of the “End 
of History”, that is, the end of liberalism, the dominant concept after the end 
of the Cold War, as the “third theory”.60 His Fourth Political Theory advocates 
for an active conservatism that is anti-rational and anti-democratic, in which 
elites  and  governance  are legitimized  through a form of “common 
spirituality”. Presenting the Fourth Political Theory as anti-modern, Dugin 
borrows from authors ranging from Samuel Huntington to Carl Schmitt to 
advocate a strong state, a Russian ‘Heartland’, and the creation of a 
geopolitical civilizational space under Russian leadership.61 Dugin refers to, 
among other things, Haushofer’s biologistic concept of Lebensraum and 
Schmitt’s idea of Nomos, the general form of organization of the objective 
and subjective factors of a given territory, as  well as the theory of Großraum.62 
In short, Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory make 
numerous eclectic references to Western theories and thinking, either to 
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Neo-Eurasianism criticizes the idea of universal values as a clearly Western 
project. In their stead, it creates civilizational and cultural zones or spaces: an 
American zone, an Afro-European zone, an Asian-Pacific zone, a Eurasian zone. 
Therewith, it not only nourishes forms of cultural relativism in (international) 
law and politics, but  also  creates breaking  points  and  cleavages between 
Russia and its conceptualized antagonistic West.63 It perceives Russia as a 
constitutive nation of the Eurasian zone with imperial tendencies. For 
example, “No nationality should be recognized territorially, because 
‘Russians exist as the only national community within a supra-national 
imperial complex’.”64 This quote expresses an ethno-differentialism that 
promotes the idea of Russian distinctiveness and sees the Eurasian space as 
a sphere in which non-Russian peoples may enjoy certain degrees of 
autonomy but not full sovereignty.65 In effect, Neo-Eurasianism and the 
Fourth Political Theory stand for a neo-traditional, anti-Western, transnational 
understanding of international norms, relations, regional and world order, and 
re-imaginations of sovereignty, territory, and citizenship in the post-Soviet 
space.66 
In sum, the Russian state both produces and assimilates concepts and ideas 
corresponding to its real or desired place within such an order.67 Legal and 
political concepts relating to space, sovereignty, territorial borders, and citi- 
zenship are core themes. This perspective underlines the need to take semi- 
otic and extra-semiotic factors into consideration when examining the ways 
in  which Russia—meaning Russian  officials  as  well  as  actors like 
international lawyers—employs ideas from Russian foreign policy, Neo-
Eurasianism, culture, and history as a means of interpreting and expressing 
the parameters of the contemporary legal and political world order and 
Russia’s place in it as a counter-concept  to  the West. 
5 The  Many  Meanings of  the Vocabulary  of  International 
Law: Approaching Clashing International Law Discourses 
between Russia and  the  West 
The Russian government’s currently postulated official positions in inter- 
national law and politics are perceived as challenges to and for the alleged 
63 Marlène Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: an ideology of empire (Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, Washington dc, 2008), 120–124. 
64 Laruelle, op.cit. note 61, 19. 
65 Laruelle, op.cit. note 61, 19 et seq. 
66 Armitage, op.cit. note 56, 6–7. 
67 Silvius, op.cit. note 14, 45–46. 
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universal European and Western approaches to sovereignty, territorial integ- 
rity, non-intervention, and self-determination.68 Russia maintains a hyper- 
formalist, positivist  approach to international law when pointing to the alleged 
hypocrisy of the West’s violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Serbia, Iraq, or Libya.69 However, the arguments raised by Russia are seen as a 
form of international legal rhetoric that Russia (ab)uses to justify its ambition 
to further consolidate its dominant (hegemonic) position in its post-Soviet 
Near Abroad.70 Nevertheless, as Oklopcic  points out: 
Unlike another geo-political crisis of our time—the attempts of  ISIS 
to redraw the map in the Middle East—the situation in Ukraine is not 
a conflict over the existence of international legal order, but rather one 
of the meaning of its foundational building blocks: The internal and 
external self-determination of peoples, territorial integrity, and the 
sovereign equality of independent states.71 
Thus, what is at risk is not the existence but the coherence and stability of 
international law and politics, in particular the usage of the international legal 
vocabulary of dispute settlement and international law’s function of offering 
institutions for the resolution of disputes. 
The intensity and complexity of the current constellations of conflicts be- 
tween Russia and the West, especially regarding Ukraine, threaten the regional 
and global political and legal order. Some even speak of an emerging Cold War 
II.72 The relevant discussions are additionally torn between two vectors: the
established usage of the language of international law and international law as 
a language of (hybrid) warfare and lawfare.73 Hybrid warfare in the post-Soviet 
space, the contestation of borders, and the meanings of sovereignty pose a 
challenge not only for doctrinal international lawyers but also for international 
lawyers whose ambitions go beyond doctrinal debates when addressing the 
conflict constellations that Ukraine currently faces.74 For the latter contingent 
of international lawyers, it is the relevance of law for the conflicts in Ukraine 
that is at stake, and they find themselves confronted with detached debates 
68 Mälksoo, op.cit. note 5, 153 et seq. 
69 Mamlyuk, op.cit., note 5, 491; Tolstykh, op.cit. note 17; Mälksoo, ibid., 182, 192. 
70 Mälksoo, ibid., 153 et seq. 
71 Oklopcic, op.cit. note 5. 
72 Mamlyuk, op.cit., note 5, 479. 
73 Ibid., 505. 
74 Oklopcic, op.cit. note 5, 353–354. 
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in different countries, addressing, for instance, the factual hierarchies among 
sovereign states.75 Thus, they also aim to explore how international lawyers 
should respond to the challenges posed by the blurring of the meanings of 
fundamental legal categories in the course of the Ukraine Crisis.76 Fully ac- 
knowledging the importance of this approach, this article now turns its focus 
to the different usage of the vocabulary of international law and the creation 
of clashing international legal  (hegemonic) discourses by Russia and the West. 
This perspective will presumably enable deeper insight into the different un- 
derstandings of the language(s)  of  international  law. 
What does hegemony mean? Here, it does not mean mere dominance of 
one country over other countries; nor is it used as a euphemism for imperial- 
ism. The term hegemony, in the present context, is rather used to describe a 
sought-after dominance or claim of universality regarding the meanings and 
interpretations of the vocabulary of international law.77 At  the same time, this 
perspective follows the assumption outlined above: rather than doctrinal ex- 
egesis, international  legal  analysis  should  approach  Russia’s  role  in  the 
conflict constellations in Ukraine through the lens of situational critique as a 
form of comparative legal studies that emphasizes the embeddedness, 
situatedness, and interrelatedness of the objects and subjects concerned.78 
This  perspective stresses the need to delve into the situational conditions of 
the parties to a (frozen) conflict, between whom a clash of discourses is 
evolving around  the usage and meanings of international legal and political 
vocabulary. The language of international law and the usage of the 
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Another clear challenge is that the public and private information spheres 
have become battlefields for the international legal and political clashes be- 
tween Russia and the West. This constellation raises questions about the reli- 
ability of sources—that is, whether there is any objectivity in them, or any 
that can be gained through them.80 ‘Reliability’ and ‘objectivity’, however, ac- 
quire different meanings from the perspective of the usage of the vocabulary 
of international law as a politics with assumed clashes of narrative and (he- 
gemonic) discourses.81 How can the term ‘hegemony’ be  applied to processes 
of making claims using the vocabulary of international law?82 Koskenniemi 
uses a hegemonic perspective as a descriptive technique whereby something 
particular—an interest or preference—is presented as something universal or 
dominant, such as a certain understanding of international law and its princi- 
ples.83 According to Koskenniemi, international law is a process of articulating 
political preferences into legal claims, which cannot be detached from politi- 
cal contestation or from the conditions under which they were made. Instead 
of being understood as universal, ingrained with objectivity, and opposed to 
hegemony, international law is seen as a hegemonic technique in which dif- 
ferent approaches to, and contestations of, international legal discourses are 
seen as hegemonic discourses.84 Thus, ‘hegemonic contestations’, according 
to Koskenniemi, are processes in which international actors routinely chal- 
lenge each other by invoking legal rules and principles onto which they project 
meanings that support their own preferences and counteract those of their 
opponents.85 Unlike Koskenniemi, this article does not assume that there are 
clear discursive preferences and outcome objectives.86 The end goal of this ar- 
ticle is not to make a neo-realist argument or provide a neo-realist analysis, 
but rather to seek the roots of, and reasons for, patterns of neo-realism in the 
concepts and discourses discussed above, namely the Near Abroad and the 
Russkii Mir, as well as sovereignty, territory, and citizenship.87 
What is at stake, when taking this perspective on the Near Abroad and the 
Russkii Mir, is, inter alia, the alleged coherence of international law. On their 
international (legal) front lines, Russia and the West argue for their respective 
80 See also Mamlyuk, op.cit. note 5, 497–498. 
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understandings of international law in order to legitimize their courses of ac- 
tion. In sum, seen from a discursive theoretical perspective based on the con- 
ceptualizations of Laclau and Mouffe, and on Glasze’s suggestions concerning 
their lexicometric and narrative, interpretative operationalization, interna- 
tional legal disputes between Russia and the West cannot (only) be understood 
as exchanges of positivistic legal arguments and evaluations but must also be 
regarded as opposing, seemingly clashing hegemonic discourses about the 
meanings and functions of international law as a powerful societal regulative 
ideal.88 
Moreover, Russia’s official argumentation regarding territorial conflicts 
in Ukraine is a good example of how Russia, though hardly neglecting sov- 
ereignty as a foundational concept of international order (politics and law), 
nonetheless challenges the legal and political meanings of the concept of 
sovereignty in its Near Abroad by establishing spatial and trans-boundary dif- 
ferences and hierarchies of sovereignty.89 Sovereignty, which has never gone 
uncontested, is a constant presence in political and legal debate and language 
but becomes changeable, for instance through radical traditional ideas like 
Neo-Eurasianism.90 The legal and political dimensions of the concept of sover- 
eignty in the post-Soviet space can be  contextualized in the foreign policy con- 
cepts of the Near Abroad, the Russkii Mir, and the theoretical and ideological 
framework of Neo-Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory. Interestingly 
enough, Russia’s argumentation concerning its own domestic and internation- 
al sovereignty and conditional sovereignty in its Near Abroad is not synchronic 
but is tied to civilization and ideas of the ‘Heartland’ and Großraum.91 This 
asynchronism and differentiation also affects Russian discourses on the terri- 
toriality of political rule and the use of force.92 Thus, the  current clash between 
Russian and Western legal discourse has led to changing spatial understand- 
ings of sovereignty rather than neglect (of  the relevance) of  sovereignty. These 
findings also underscore that there “hardly ever was a genuine and deep-going 
agreement  between  Moscow and  the West  regarding  the  underlying  values 
88 Georg Glasze, “Vorschläge zur Operationalisierung der Diskurstheorie von Laclau und 
Mouffe in einer Triangulation von lexikometrischen und interpretativen Methoden”, 33(1) 
Historical  Social  Research (2008), 185–223; Judith Renner, “‘Versöhnung’ als leerer Signifi- 
kant im Kontext politischer Transitionen: eine diskurstheoretische Konzeptualisierung”, 
86(1/2) Die  Friedens-Warte (2011), 245–270. 
89 Mälksoo, op.cit. note 5, 189 et seq. 
90 Dieter Grimm, Souveränität. Herkunft und Zukunft eines Schlüsselbegriffs (Berlin Univer- 
sity Press, Berlin, 2009), 117. 
91 Ibid., 100–101. 
92 Ibid., 104. 
22 
and principles of the post-World War II international legal order”.93 This 
conflictual constellation does not imply that the term ‘sovereignty’ has lost its 
connection to contemporary ideas of political rule and authority in the post-
Soviet space or  that  the content of sovereignty would not matter. However, it  
is likely to lead to permanent contestation of any universal understanding of 
state-centered sovereignty during efforts to address post-Soviet (frozen) 
conflicts and Russia’s role in them.94 
6       Summary   and   Outlook 
Since 2014, Ukraine, usually on the periphery of mainstream attention,95 has 
been the actual and metaphorical ‘hybrid’ battleground, in terms of interna- 
tional law and politics, between Russia and its conceptual antagonist, the West. 
Hybrid warfare and lawfare in international law and politics has put Ukraine’s 
sovereignty at stake, with broader implications for the long-term configuration 
of diverging understandings and clashing discourses about the transcontinen- 
tal meanings of territorial integrity, borders, citizenship, and sovereignties in 
the post-Soviet space, and for Russia’s geopolitical and legal role in it.96 These 
findings call for continuous interdisciplinary conversations.97 Such conversa- 
tions, however, face  an obstacle: a  deficit  of  area  knowledge  and  expertise 
born of a certain neglect of legal and political area studies, especially 
East European studies,  in  the  course  of  the  past  25  years.98 
93 Mälksoo, op.cit. note 5, 177; concerning sovereignty, see ibid., 100. 
94 Ibid., 115–116. 
95 Ute Schaeffer, Ukraine. Reportagen aus einem Land im Aufbruch (Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 
Bonn, 2015), 7, 9, 102 et  seq.; Andreas Kappeler, Geschichte der Ukraine (C.H. Beck, Bonn, 
2015), 334–382. 
96 Oklopcic, op.cit. note 5, 363; Schaeffer, ibid., 128. 
97 Oklopcic, ibid. 
98 Illustrative of this point is the fact that the most heated and prominent public academic 
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and Jörg Barberowski. See Adam Soboczynski and Elisabeth von Thadden, “Wer ver- 
steht den Schurken?”, interview with Karl Schlögel and Jörg Barberowski, Die Zeit (16 July 
2015); see also Karl Schlögel, Entscheidung in Kiew. Ukrainische Lektionen (Hanser Verlag, 
München, 2015), 9–17 (on historians and interpreting current conflicts and events); 
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